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Abstract
We analyze and reframe AI progress. In addition to the prevailing metrics of performance, we highlight
the usually neglected costs paid in the development and deployment of a system, including: data, expert
knowledge, human oversight, software resources, computing cycles, hardware and network facilities, de-
velopment time, etc. These costs are paid throughout the life cycle of an AI system, fall differentially on
different individuals, and vary in magnitude depending on the replicability and generality of the AI solu-
tion. The multidimensional performance and cost space can be collapsed to a single utility metric for a user
with transitive and complete preferences. Even absent a single utility function, AI advances can be generi-
cally assessed by whether they expand the Pareto (optimal) surface. We explore a subset of these neglected
dimensions using the two case studies of Alpha* and ALE. This broadened conception of progress in AI
should lead to novel ways of measuring success in AI, and can help set milestones for future progress.
1 Introduction
Metrics of scientific progress can play an outsized role in the perception of a field and in the allocation of
its resources. By contrast, that which goes unmeasured is often neglected. We argue for a more general
accounting of progress in AI, so as to better map attention and metrics to scientific achievement.
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The prevailing approach to assessing AI progress consists of measuring performance, such as the raw or
normalized score in a game, ELO rating, error rate, accuracy, and so forth, often plotted over time to evaluate
temporal progress [11, 32]. Performance, however, does not exactly correspond with social value or scientific
progress in AI. Misalignment between what is measured and what is desired can lead to misallocation of
energy and resources. Specifically, excessive effort is likely to go towards achieving novel performance
benchmarks, and insufficient effort towards progress on other dimensions relevant to social value, economic
value, and scientific progress, such as compute efficiency, data efficiency, novelty, replicability, autonomy,
and generality.
This does not mean that quantitative assessment and benchmarks should be abandoned. On the contrary,
we need more and better measurement [18]: measurement which is more comprehensive, general, and fo-
cused on the cost function of the ultimate beneficiaries. Ultimately, in assessing progress we would like to
weight all the resources that users (or receivers) of a technology require to achieve their goals. For instance,
to what extent does progress on a particular metric of performance in machine translation map on to user’s
satisfaction? Does the progress also correspond to a reduction in cost per translation, or in time for execution?
If a paper develops a new technique, how easily can new algorithms and applications integrate and benefit
from it?
In general, users seek the benefits of high performance (at a set of tasks), while they seek to minimize the
costs of developing and deploying their system. Sensitivity to costs is true for individual consumers, firms
and developers, as well as other scientists. Some kinds of hidden costs can appear during development, when
an application is produced, when reproduced at a large scale, or when adapted to other domains. Some future
costs will be born by future developers or scientists, sometimes referred to as “technical debt” or “research
debt”. Other costs may be spread more broadly, and are thus harder to account for. As in other sectors,
there are externalities from AI development and deployment which are important to be aware of; among
the negative externalities are environmental footprints, user privacy, skill atrophy (e.g., the Google effect),
opacity in decision making, etc. Attention to, and ideally measurement of, these externalities is beneficial, as
it is a first step towards internalizing them.
In this paper we consider this wide range of costs, though we focus on the costs born by future developers,
such as the costs in computation, data, knowledge, software, human attention, and calendar time. We will
identify how costs are distributed depending on the stage in which they are incurred, the number of times they
are replicated, and the actor covering each cost. These dimensions should be integral to the measurement of
AI progress.
The estimation of these dimensions is fraught with difficulties. To what extent are performance bench-
marks actually representative of the target problem domain? To what extent are solutions overly specialized
for the performance benchmark, as opposed to being more general, thus shaping the costs of adapting the
solution to an adjacent problem domain? To what extent are solutions more reproducible by other teams, due
to the availability of software and datasets? As an illustration of these difficulties and how they can be over-
come, we will analyze several case studies where we evaluate performance alongside these other dimensions.
As a result, we overhaul the notion of progress in these domains.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we offer the most detailed and formal analysis to date of the
dimensions of AI progress. While previous work has attempted to quantify progress in the performance of
a specific system, we more fully account for the resources required and the generality of solutions. Second,
in so doing we surface neglected dimensions of AI progress that may be optimized more directly. Third, we
offer a novel framing under Pareto optimality for assessing performance and costs of an AI system, which
suggests a more principled approach to forecasting future developments in AI, with myriad applications for
policy, ethical, and economic analysis, and better research portfolio optimization within the field of AI itself.
2 Background
There was a time that benchmarks were unusual in AI, but today almost every area of AI has its own bench-
marks and competitions [17]. Most researchers accept these challenges and invest great effort in improving
on these metrics of performance. Indeed, many reports about AI progress include summaries of these bench-
marks [11, 32]. We discuss here four issue areas arising from excessive focus on performance: representa-
tiveness, specialization, reproducibility and resources.
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Regarding representativeness, many benchmarks and competitions are used in AI, but they vary in how
representative they are of the fundamental problems in their respective subfields [17, 19]. For instance, it
has recently been recognized that the Winograd Schema challenge only partially represents commonsense
reasoning. As a reaction, challenges in AI are realigned to achieve more and better automation [13, 7]), or the
aspiration of more human-like AI [23, 27]. A deeper concern is that most benchmarks are not really fostering
the basic scientific advances needed to move the field forward, be they theoretical advances, explanatory
insights, or tools to facilitate other work. This issue of non-representativeness is partly addressed through the
review process, and requirements such as controlling the percentage of papers in different areas [31].
The second issue, specialization, is related to representativeness. When a benchmark or competition be-
comes the target, researchers will have incentives to overly specialize their systems to performance according
to that benchmark, at the cost of other features of their system, such as generalizability. If we had a satisfac-
tory metric of generality then we could use that as a benchmark, but it remains an open question how best to
operationalize generality [18], balancing between putting all the distribution mass on a few tasks [25]—and
not really being general—or distributing it in a block-uniform way—facing the no free lunch theorems [38].
A third issue is reproducibility, and the wider notion of replicability. In AI this was usually understood
as requiring the sharing of data and code, but the concept is becoming richer [10, 4, 16]. Indeed, we must
distinguish between specifically reproducing the results, and replicating the findings with some variations
[39]. Several initiatives have been proposed to facilitate (or even require) a wider replicability. For instance,
with the “open leaderboards” [36], participants have to upload their code so that other participants can make
modifications and submit another proposal.
Finally, users are generally sensitive to the resource cost of developing and deploying an AI system, which
performance benchmarks rarely explicitly take into account. Much AI progress is said to be attributable to
advances in computational power [29]. However, it is not straightforward to quantify what exactly can be
attributed to software progress, hardware progress or several other resources [6, 14]. Accordingly, perhaps it
is more effective to just measure the so-called “end-to-end performance”, including computational time and
quality of the models, such as the recent DAWNBench for deep learning [9]. Other resources, such as data,
are at least as important, especially in machine learning1. But it seems subjective to determine what input is
seen positively or negatively, or even considered as cheating: too much data (supervised or unsupervised), too
much knowledge (constraints, rules or bias), enriched input [5], etc. The question depends mostly on the cost
of the resource. Human resources (“human computation”) are also common in AI to increase performance or
generality (but at the cost of autonomy).
Overall, there are many resources involved but, at the moment, there is no integrated framework taking
into account all of them. Related approaches involve the ideas of utility functions, Pareto-optimal analysis
and, most especially, cost-sensitive learning [12]. [37] identifies costs related to inputs and outputs in classifi-
cation (errors, instability, attributes, labeling, actioning) data (cases), computation and human preprocessing.
In this paper, we offer a general statement of this idea, applied to AI progress.
In the end, when assessing AI progress in a comprehensive way, one should consider the whole life
cycle of research, innovation, production, and reproduction. Notions such as technical or research debt are
becoming more recognized, as they incorporate some costs that are not perceived at early stages of the process
but appear later on, when the technology or product is put into practice [30, 16, 28].
3 Components and integration
In this section, we flesh out a comprehensive list of dimensions that are required for an “AI system” to work.
We use the term “system” in a flexible way, including an agent, an algorithm, a product, etc., proposed in a
research paper or by a company. Given the fuzzy contours of AI, human automation is usually recognized as
a goal for AI. However, it is actually difficult to distinguish when reports and forecasts about “automation”
[13, 7] are assuming conditions such as “at a reasonable cost”, “to a high degree of automation”, etc., versus
“full automation at whatever cost”. The estimated probability of automation for a given task might change
completely depending on these conditions. In the end, automation is important, but it is the efficiency of the
whole system what matters, including any “human computation” involved. This view of efficiency links us
directly to the resources involved in an AI system and their associated costs.
1See https://sites.google.com/site/dataefficientml/bibliography for a bibliography on data-efficient ML.
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Table 1 shows the resources we identified as frequently involved in developing and deploying AI systems.
These resources have fuzzy boundaries and are often fungible with each other. For instance, the distinction
between data and knowledge is not always clear, and hardware and software may be highly intertwined. Hu-
man resources are typically considered under “manipulation”, but can appear in relation to the other resources
(e.g., labeled data and teaching a robot might be assigned to rd and rm respectively). This is not a problem,
as long as all the resources are identified.
Description Example
rd Data: All kinds of data (unsupervised, su-
pervised, queries, measurements).
A self-driving car needs on-
line traffic information.
rk Knowledge: Rules, constraints, bias, utility
functions, etc., that are required.
A spam filter requires the
cost matrix from the user.
rs Software: Main algorithm, associated li-
braries, operating system, etc.
A planner uses a SAT
solver.
rh Hardware: Computer hardware, sensors, ac-
tuators, motors, batteries, etc.
A drone needs a 3D radar
for operation.
rm Manipulation: Manual (human-operated)
intervention through assistance
A robot needs to be manu-
ally re-calibrated.
rc Computation: Computational resources
(CPU, GPU usage) of all the components
A nearest neighbor classi-
fier computes all distances.
rn Network: Communication resources (Inter-
net, swarm synchronisation, distribution).
An automated delivery sys-
tem connects all drones.
rt Time: Calendar (physical) time needed:
waiting/night times, iteration cycles.
A PA requires cyclical data
(weeks) to find patterns.
Table 1: Resources that are frequently needed by AI systems.
It is appealing to collapse the benefits and costs of an AI system to a single metric. For any given user with
rational (transitive and complete) preferences, their preferences can be represented using a utility function.
A firm’s utility function, for example, might correspond to risk-adjusted expected profit. A user’s utility
function might be harder to quantify, but is generically increasing in the performance of the system and
decreasing in the costs of the system. Denote a performance vector, ψ, for a given problem, which is often
a unidimensional quantitative score (such as the error), but could also have several components. A utility
function maps performance and all associated resources to a single dimension:
U(ψ, r¯) = U(ψ, rd, rk, rs, rh, rm, rc, rn, rt)→ u (1)
In some cases this is an additively separable function, such that U(ψ, r¯) = B(ψ) −∑x Cx(rx), with the
first term accounting for the benefit according to the performance of the system minus the costs produced by
the use of resources (note that the cost functions Cx are different for each resource). For economic applica-
tions, we might be able to separate the utility function into performance generating revenue (in dollars), and
resources imposing costs (in dollars).
In many cases, we are not able to collapse performance and costs into a single metric, perhaps because
the utility function is not known or varies across a population of users. Still, we can productively examine the
relative performance and costs of different systems. For any number of dimensions, we can assess the Pareto-
optimal surface, as we do in Fig. 1 for two indicators (we explore this further in section 5). We may want
to focus on one dimension of costs, such as economic costs or energy costs (as per the “carbon footprint”).
For example, Fig. 1 shows algorithms and architectures according to their MNIST prediction error and power
consumption, revealing that most solutions are not on the Pareto surface on these dimensions, with notable
exceptions, such as some ASIC architectures, which focus on efficiency in terms of chip space, speed and
“energy footprint” [8].
4 The full range of accounting
The benefits and costs of developing and deploying an AI system are not incurred only once, but through-
out the many uses, reuses, and follow-on contributions. Some costs are born exclusively during the initial
conception and development, while others recur with each adaptation to a new application, or even each ap-
plication to a particular user. In general, the total resource burden should be accounted for according to the
whole cycle of the AI system.
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Figure 1: Performance for MNIST [24], for 22 papers, compared to power consumption (data from [29]). The Pareto
front is also shown (we will discuss whether the points can actually be joined by straight segments in section 5).
Fig. 2 shows how the dimensions we identified can become relevant at different stages of the life cycle
of an AI system. Consider a new algorithm for voice recognition. Apart from all the human thinking, there
will be a great effort in terms of failed experiments, different libraries used, users testing the early systems,
etc. If a company takes these ideas and builds a prototype, the tests, software, hardware, and compute
will concentrate on production. When the system is reproduced (installed or shipped) to users, additional
resource costs will be incurred. Further, if the idea can be adapted for other applications (e.g., adapting
a voice recognition system to other languages), depending on its generality and reproducibility, the initial
contribution can provide further value, at some further adaptation cost including the need for new corpora,
training, semantic knowledge, etc.
Conceive 
(research) Ideas, 
algorithms, 
components,...
Produce 
(implement)
Reproduce 
(copy)Application, 
Product
Service / 
Solution  A
Services / 
Solutions 2, 3,...
Multiplicities
(prototypes)
Multiplicities 
(shipping, install)
Multiplicities 
(extend, customise)
Replicate 
(generalize)
Multiplicities (tests 
and improvements)
Internal (private) resources
External (socialized) resources
rx’, ry’, ... rx’, ry’, ... rx’, ry’, ... rx’, ry’, ...
rx, ry, ...rx, ry, ...rx, ry, ...rx, ry, ...
Figure 2: Illustrative representation of stages of the AI system life cycle where resources might be required.
At each stage of the life cycle, the contribution may be deployed a multiplicity of times (represented
above the boxes in Fig. 2). The total value of the contribution thus needs to take into account the scale of
its deployment. For instance, some early speech recognition systems were pre-trained once (the system cost,
denoted by C, covering the “conceive” and “produce” stages in Fig. 2) and then adapted to thousands of
users, with extra hours of customization per user (the application cost, denoted by Cj with j indexing each
of the n applications, or users, covering the “reproduce” and “replicate” stages). More recent general speech
recognition systems do not need such customization. Consequently, the application cost Cj is lower per user.
In both cases, the total cost C is C+
∑n
j=1 Cj . As the number of applications increases, the average cost will
converge to the average application cost as the system cost is amortized. For this reason, for contributions
that have many possible applications, it is worth paying additional system costs so as to make the contribution
more general, adaptable, and reusable, and thereby bring down the application costs. Since AI contributions
often have broad potential applicability, contributions that are general, adaptable, and reusable are likely to
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have especially high utility.
Fig. 2 not only covers direct “internal” costs (rx, ry , . . . ) but also some external “debts” or “socializa-
tion” costs (r′x, r
′
y , . . . ). For instance, automated customer service systems (call centers) clearly were not a
Pareto improvement relative to previous systems, even though they may be a profit maximizing improvement.
Companies reduce their labor costs for customer service by substituting in phone-trees and voice recognition,
but in the process impose time, frustration, and other costs onto the customer. Some navigators and personal
assistants can make users more dependent on them, atrophying some capabilities or leading to a simplifica-
tion of language. In other words, the user adapts to the AI system, and assumes part of the effort or cost.
In general, technological innovation both involves developing technology to fit a given conception of the
task, and adapting conceptions of the task to fit the capabilities of technology. In the process of adapting
work processes, customer expectations, relationship norms, and even urban design to what is technologically
convenient, there can be consequences for society that are not internalized by the designers and deployers of
these systems. This footprint of AI is not usually acknowledged in benchmarking.
From the previous sections, we conclude that the contribution of an AI development should, in principle,
be given a full accounting of the costs and benefits, across the contribution’s full life cycle. The current em-
phasis on targeting and reporting performance benchmarks, however, poses an obstacle to a full accounting.
Reproducibility and replicability are two traditional tools for addressing this. More precisely:
• Specific reproducibility refers to whether the same result can be obtained from the same conditions and
procedures. In AI, this requires that all the necessary code and data are given. This also assumes the
same cost functions as well:
∑n
j=1
∑
x Cjx(rjx) = n
∑
x Cx(rx).
• General replicability will check whether the AI technique can be applied to other problems, a set of n
tasks, applications, or users indexed by j, with an overall cost
∑n
j=1
∑
x Cjx(rjx) that must consider the
adaptation effort, with different resources rjx and cost functions Cjx per user.
Especially for replicability, we can experiment with different hardware architectures, change some of the
software and get different computational costs, apart from different performance. That means that the partial
results for each Bj and Cjx(rjx) might be different, but we still have something replicable with similar utility.
A clear example of this notion of replicability is “approximate computation” in deep learning, where one can
get much smaller computational costs without a significant change in accuracy [29].
5 Exploring the Pareto-front of AI research
Corporations, governments, startups, NGOs, personal users, and contemporary and future AI researchers are
the intended recipients, or receivers, of the AI technologies being developed, and they each have different
preferences, resources and constraints, or in other words different operating characteristics. The familiar
concept of the ROC curve plots true positive rates (TPR) and false positive rates (FPR) for binary classifiers,
and emphasizes the importance of comparing multi-dimensional surfaces, rather than single metrics.
For instance, Fig. 3 (left) just shows a single metric, performance, as a function of time. This plot does not
explain what the cluster of attempts after 2014 really contribute, when they have more error than the already
obtained human level. Other dimensions are neglected in this plot, limiting insight about progress. In the
next section we will see other domains where some of the resources are actually put as dimensions.
Before analyzing the case studies, we have to understand how to build and work with the Pareto front.
When resources are included, the analysis of optimal Pareto surfaces might be slightly different than the
traditional triangulization approach. When showing performance metrics such as TPR and FPR for two
models, any point in between can be obtained by interpolation, connecting any two points by a straight
segment. However, we should note that these points require the implementation of both models. While some
of the resources can be interpolated, others (e.g., software) will simply sum up, and the points between two
other points will not be achievable with a straight line, but by an axis-parallel route.
For instance, Fig. 3 (right) shows performance against one particular resource. For each method, A, B,
C, D, and E, the numbers represent the extremes when varying their parameters. E1 represents a random (or
baseline) model. Assuming no interpolation is possible, the Pareto front here is shown in blue. Methods C
and B can be discarded, as they do not reach anywhere that cannot already be achieved with A, E and D.
The diversity of receivers and the number of dimensions suggest that a single utility metric is simplistic —
different receivers would have different subjective utilities for different dimensions. This operating condition
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Figure 3: Left: Performance for the MNIST benchmark (data from EFF). Right: A schematic representation of techniques
A, B, C, D, E, with variants, the areas they cover, and the resulting Pareto front.
translates into a vector, or gradient, in the multidimensional space. For example, large technology corpora-
tions may gain significant utility from a discovery that allows modest speed-ups in exchange for significantly
increased compute demands, whereas individual researchers, personal users and startups may find little value
in such a discovery. Conversely, the existence of real recipients whose preferences can be known in advance
allows us to prioritize exploration of those configurations. From the above, we derive a few criteria to identify
progress events:
• Improving the Pareto front for a known group of recipients (A1, A3 or D3 in Fig. 3, right). This would
include all-else-being-equal improvements in performance, but also reductions in computation, data,
manipulation or other resources in Table 1. This would not, however, consider extreme regions no
recipient assigns value to.
• Covering a location slightly under the Pareto front with more flexibility (B3 in Fig. 3, right). Instead of
reaching some areas by combining existing approaches, a new technique can reach there easily with a
trade-off between its own parameters, allowing more receivers to easily find their subjectively optimal
trade-offs.
• Covering a location slightly under the Pareto front with more diversity (C in Fig. 3, right, if it is very
different from A). The current dominant technique or paradigm can push the Pareto-optimal front for
some time, but slightly suboptimal approaches, especially if they are radically different (i.e., alternative
“research programs”), should not be discarded because they may lead to potential improvement in the
Pareto-optimal front if the current paradigm stalls.
Receivers can be incentivized to generate and communicate their gradients (though in some cases, counter-
vailing considerations may exist such as commercial secrecy). It is also in the interests of discoverers to show
the recipients benefited by their discovery. Brokers of such information (peer-review, surveys, competitions,
etc.) are in a position to meet the incentives (and gradients) of both researchers and recipients by ensuring
such discoveries are properly rewarded.
6 Case studies
In this section we will examine two representative case studies of progress in AI: Alpha* and ALE.
Alpha* refers to a series of papers and associated techniques by DeepMind to play board games. We
analyzed the whole series, from AlphaGo [33] (including the Fan and Lee versions, used against Fan Hui and
Lee Sedol, respectively, and its latest version, AlphaGo Master, which won 60 straight online games against
professional Go players), AlphaGo Zero [35] (a version created without using data from human games) and
AlphaZero [34] (which uses an approach similar to AlphaGo Zero to master not just Go, but also chess and
shogi).
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AlphaGo
Fan
AlphaGo
Lee
AlphaGo
Master
AlphaGo
Zero
AlphaZero 
rd (Data) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
rk (Knowledge) ○ ○ ○ ○ 
rs (Software) ○ × × ○ × 
rh (Hardware) × × × × × 
rm (Manipulation)       ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
rc (Computation) ✓ ○ ○ ✓ ○ 
rn (Network) - - - - - 
rt (Time) - - - - - 
𝝍 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ○ (Performance)
✓ 
○ 
Table 2: Dimensions (resources and performance) reported in the Alpha* papers. Systems from [33, 35, 34].
Table 2 shows whether the dimensions were reported in the papers (✓), only partially accounted for (◦),
not mentioned but relevant (×) and not applicable (−). Many dimensions are relevant for the analysis: the
data, the knowledge, the software, the hardware, manipulation, computation and, of course, performance,
etc. However, only some of them are provided, which makes a comprehensive comparison of the whole
space difficult. Still, we will represent three dimensions: performance (in ELO ranking, which can only be
partially estimated for AlphaZero), computational resources (using the equivalence: 1 TPUv2 ≃ 3 TPUv1 ≃
36 GPU ≃ 180 CPU [21]) and human manipulation resources (as represented quantitatively by the ELO
ranking of the player or players the system learns from). Other dimensions (like knowledge2 about Go,
software, etc.) are not included because of insufficient information from some papers.
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Figure 4: Multidimensional utility space for Alpha* (left) and ALE (right). Research gradient evolution from 2013
to 2018 represented with a segmented gray arrow. The Pareto front (dashed black) does not include other resources
(software, and humans used for training) that duplicate for connecting segments.
What we see in Fig. 4 (left) is that the Pareto front at the moment is represented by AlphaGo Lee and
AlphaGo Zero. AlphaGo Fan is discarded because AlphaGo Zero needs less compute, no manipulation and
gets better performance.
Why is AlphaZero a breakthrough if it is not Pareto optimal? The answer is generality. AlphaGo* only
solved one task (Go) and AlphaZero can solve several tasks. Finally, if we look chronologically at the plot,
we see that the main gradient that has been followed has been performance.
The second case study is ALE [3], a collection of Atari games that has become popular for the evaluation
of general-purpose RL algorithms learning from screen shots. We selected all the papers (systems) from
2We have the constructed features: stones to be captured or escaped, legal moves, ‘liberties’, etc. While this knowledge is crucial,
there is no cost for a new match (reproduction), but the adaptation of AlphaZero to other games (replication), may be important.
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EFF’s AI Progress Measurement Project [11] and the papers introducing the Rainbow [20] and REACTOR
agents [15].
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rd ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
rk    ○ ○ × ✓ × ○ × ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ × × ○ ○ ○ × ✓ ✓ 
rs × × × ✓ × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ✓ × 
rh × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
× ✓ × ✓ × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
rc ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ✓ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ✓ ✓ 
rn - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
rt - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
𝝍 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ○ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
rm 
Table 3: Same as Table 2 for the ALE papers (from EFF [11] and [15, 20]).
Table 3 shows what information we found about the resources and performance. Again, many dimensions
are relevant, but only a few are systematically reported: data, computation and performance. Fig. 4 (right)
represents computation and performance. Computation time (whenever the authors do not provide this in-
formation explicitly) is roughly estimated from the kind of approach used, whether it is follow-up work, the
training setting used, etc., or from figures in more recent papers, which make explicit comparisons between
them and the state of the art [20, 15]. What we see in Fig. 4 (right) is a current Pareto front dominated by
REACTOR variants, ES FF and Best Linear. The research gradient (in gray) has changed over the years, with
some disregard of compute initially and more concern in efficiency recently.3
For this benchmark, it is common to find “learning curves” in the papers (e.g., [26]), which show per-
formance varying on the number of episodes. This is clearly the rd (data) but it also influences directly on
computation. These learning curves give information of full regions of the multidimensional space, as we
saw in Fig. 2.
Finally, for some papers, the comparison was not possible (e.g., due to different subsets of games). It is
important to note, however, that some approaches based on genetic programming [22] and on planning [2]
are valuable in terms of diversity.
7 Conclusions
The interest in more comprehensive evaluation protocols, going beyond performance alone, is represented
by some of the references we included in section 2 on cost-sensitive learning, reproducibility, generality,
data-efficiency and computational costs. However, in order to rigorously evaluate a novel contribution to AI
progress more broadly, we need a more formal analysis. This is done by an explicit enumeration of all the
dimensions (as represented by Table 1) and their integration into utility functions or their representation in a
multidimensional space, with a clear delimitation of the extent of accounting. This is what happened in cost-
sensitive learning more than 15 years ago [12, 37], leading to a wide range of techniques that covered different
operating conditions. While all these costs are nowadays integrated into the measures of performance, many
3 The computation times shown in Fig. 4 (left) include both training and deployment (system and application costs). Hence, a
model that is half way between models A and B (choosing between them with equal probability), denoted by AB, has performance
ψ(AB) = 0.5ψ(A) + 0.5ψ(B), but has a computational cost of rc(AB) = rc(A) + rc(B). This is why the Pareto front in Fig. 4
(left) has parallel segments, as in Fig. 3 (right). However, in Fig. 4 (right), we can have A train and play for half of the ALE games and
B train and play for the rest. As we average for the whole set of games, we can actually have rc(AB) = 0.5rc(A) + 0.5rc(B), at
least if there is no transfer effort between games. This is why the Pareto front on the right is shown with direct straight segments.
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other resources are not, as we have surfaced here. We hope this paper can launch the study of “cost-sensitive
AI”. Within this framework, we make a series of recommendations:
• Benchmarks and competitions should be defined in terms of a more comprehensive utility function,
considering as many dimensions as possible, or recognize the value of all contributions that have any
of the positive effects on the Pareto front identified in Section 5, in short or long terms.
• Papers presenting or evaluating algorithms should generally try to report the whole region they cover,
and how to navigate the region by modifying parameters or resources. There are many partial exam-
ples nowadays: learning curves, plots comparing the number of models vs. performance, planning
performance vs. lookahead, etc.
• These utility functions and multidimensional spaces must also be seen in terms of replicability, for
variants of the problems and at different stages of the AI life cycle. The multiplicities are more difficult
to plot graphically, but we can still define operating conditions depending on the adaptation (or transfer)
effort for m problems, or n users.
Frequently, we will not be able to say that one technique is ‘better’ than another: they just cover different
regions of the multidimensional space. It is the receiver who will choose the system that best fits their
needs. Having a representation of the Pareto front may hugely facilitate this choice for other researchers and
industry, as simply as moving the gradient until touching the Pareto surface. Also, small players in AI could
focus on those areas that require less resources and still contribute to the Pareto front or to diversity. Finally,
the Pareto surface can help detect some societal risks, especially if we see that a powerful capability in AI
can be achieved with very few resources, becoming available to malicious actors.
This view of the operating condition as a gradient may suggest clever approaches to push the front for
some resources, as gradient descent is increasingly being used at a meta-level [1]. In general, we hope this
paper will help change perceptions, promote more general and versatile techniques, highlight the trade-offs,
and raise awareness of the overall “AI footprint”, well beyond performance.
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